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Small but Deadly: The Minié Ball
Abstract

When Claude-E’tienne Minié perfected the minié ball in 1849, it is doubtful he knew of the carnage that it
would cause in the American Civil War some twelve years later. However, this small and compact bullet can
teach us far more than simply the horrific bloodletting it caused on the battlefield itself. A closer analysis of the
bullet’s impact on the human body also reveals a deeper glimpse into Civil War hospitals, medicine, and an
entirely new scale and scope of death with which Victorian Americans were forced to come to terms as the
war’s long casualty lists poured in from both on and off the battlefield. Considered by many to be a significant
technological advancement in the 1840s for its supposedly marked increase in range and accuracy, this bullet
was initially expected to have a revolutionary impact on battle tactics; however, as recent scholarship has
shown, the ball’s impacts were most significantly felt not in the number of men it felled on a battlefield, but in
the severity of the wounds it inflicted on its targets. [excerpt]
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Small but Deadly: The Minié Ball
By Isaac Shoop ’21

Minié balls (via Wikimedia Commons)

When Claude-E’tienne Minié perfected the minié ball in 1849, it is doubtful he knew of
the carnage that it would cause in the American Civil War some twelve years later.
However, this small and compact bullet can teach us far more than simply the horrific
bloodletting it caused on the battlefield itself. A closer analysis of the bullet’s impact on
the human body also reveals a deeper glimpse into Civil War hospitals, medicine, and an
entirely new scale and scope of death with which Victorian Americans were forced to
come to terms as the war’s long casualty lists poured in from both on and off the
battlefield. Considered by many to be a significant technological advancement in the
1840s for its supposedly marked increase in range and accuracy, this bullet was initially
expected to have a revolutionary impact on battle tactics; however, as recent scholarship
has shown, the ball’s impacts were most significantly felt not in the number of men it
felled on a battlefield, but in the severity of the wounds it inflicted on its targets.
The minié ball was primarily the invention of two French army captains, ClaudeE’tienne Minié and Henri-Gustave Dolvigue, in 1849. To provide ease of use in combat
situations, the minié ball was made slightly smaller than the intended gun bore so it
could be pushed down the barrel with little resistance. The bullet was made out of soft
lead, had a conical shape, and had anywhere from two to four rings at the base. These
characteristics allowed the minié ball to expand and engage the rifling of the gun barrel

when it was fired, keeping the bullet on a straighter path. Such innovations did help to
improve accuracy and slightly increased the range of the rifle musket over that of
smoothbores, but the parabolic trajectory of the minie ball, combined with soldiers’
deficient training and both preference as well as skill for short-range firing, ultimately
prevented any significant increase in long-range use or accuracy on the battlefield.
In 1855, the United States Army, under the direction of Secretary of War Jefferson
Davis, adopted the minié ball and the rifled musket. The effectiveness of the rifled
musket and minié ball were proven in the Crimean War in the 1850s when French and
British forces used them against Russia’s smoothbore muskets. In the United States, the
two most popular rifled muskets were the .69 caliber Harpers Ferry and the .58 caliber
Springfield. When the Civil War erupted in the Spring of 1861, both sides still relied on
the older and outdated smoothbore muskets because of the time and money it took to
produce the new weapons. However, as the war progressed, the new rifled musket and
minié ball phased out the smoothbore muskets. In terms of production of this new
weaponry, the North had the upper hand. By 1860, about 90% of the United States
manufacturing output came from the North. During the war, the North produced 32
times the number of firearms as the South did; for every 100 firearms the South
manufactured, the North produced 3,200. In addition to having superior manufacturing
capabilities, the North also had the advantage of more efficient transportation. The
North housed around 70% of the nation’s railroads, which meant that it could transport
weapons and ammunition to the front lines faster than the South could. With superior
manufacturing capabilities, the North was able to equip its men on the front lines with
this new technology faster and quicker than the South, thus gaining a slight
technological advantage over the South.
The evolution and expanded use of the minié ball made many military commanders
believe it would be necessary to overhaul military tactics. The range of the rifled musket
was 300 yards to a ½ mile, whereas the range of a smoothbore musket was only 50 to
200 yards. In reality, though, both weapons were most effective in the same range of
about 100 yards. The rifled musket could not take full advantage of its increased range
because of the arc the minié ball travelled on, which created two killing zones. The first
killing zone occurred in the first 100 yards and the second from 240 to 350 yards.
Soldiers were relatively safe from roughly 100 to 240 yards because the arc of the minié
ball, which made the bullet travel over their heads. With intense training, soldiers could
accommodate for this arc, but they rarely received that much training and thus they
could not take full advantage of the improved range of the rifled musket. Additionally,
attacking troops quickly learned how to more efficiently navigate their ways through
these two killing zones, thus reducing the number of possible casualties. However,
within those killing zones, the impact of the minie ball could be catastrophic, especially
to long, thin lines of attacking soldiers. Although successful in numerous Civil War
battles such as Gaines’ Mill and Kennesaw Mountain, frontal assaults, if not properly
executed and coordinated, could become suicidal in the Civil War, as can be seen
through General Burnside’s attack on Marye’s Heights, at the Battle of Fredericksburg,
in December 1862, and Pickett’s Charge, at the Battle of Gettysburg, in July 1863. At

Fredericksburg, attacking Union forces suffered 12,500 casualties and in Pickett’s
Charge alone, Confederate forces suffered over 6,000 casualties.
The improved military technology also led to evolution in the care offered at Civil War
hospitals in order to keep up with the thousands of casualties that resulted when the
minie ball did indeed hit its target. The soft lead of the minié ball caused the ball to
flatten out upon hitting its target, and when the target was a human body, the bullet
shattered bones and destroyed tissue in catastrophic ways. The increasingly grisly
damage of the minie ball led to the high number of amputations performed at Civil War
hospitals. Also, when a minié ball entered the human body, it could carry with it any
foreign matter it picked up from the uniform, which meant a greater risk of infection.
Although, over the course of the war, doctors developed a greater sense for some of the
underlying causes of the rampant diseases that claimed the majority of Civil War
soldiers’ lives, gangrenous wounds often spelled a death sentence for many men. Thus,
the minié ball was responsible for a majority of combat casualties, with minie ballinduced amputations responsible for 3 out of 4 operations performed at Civil War
hospitals.
Although the minié ball did not change military tactics as much as anticipated, it would
be hard to argue to soldiers that the ball did not have a tremendous impact on their
lives. For the many soldiers who were hit by a minié ball, or who lost comrades to the
small scrap of lead, their lives were forever changed. Wounds caused by the bullet were
often severe and, in many cases, required amputations, which left Victorian Americans,
both civilians and soldiers, with the difficult task of coping with horrific and disfiguring
injuries and long casualty lists. When added to the seemingly endless deaths soldiers
succumbed to through disease, torturous, minie ball-inflicted fatalities further
challenged Victorians’ conceptions of “the Good Death” and their reckoning with the
graphic suffering they were forced to endure for four long years on behalf of cause and
country. Wounded soldiers also faced the difficult task of integrating back into a postwar society. The minié ball may seem small and insignificant, but it had many farreaching impacts that extended well beyond the battlefield and that still fascinate
scholars and the American public today.
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